The Monroe Doctrine is a United States foreign policy that opposes foreign involvement in the Western Hemisphere. It was created to prevent European countries from interfering in the political matters of the Americas. The policy states that any outside action by European powers in the Americas is a threat to the United States. This idea was important to American foreign policy throughout the 20th century.

President James Monroe introduced the doctrine on December 2, 1823, during his seventh annual State of the Union Address to Congress. At that time, most Spanish colonies in the Americas had already gained independence or were close to doing so. Monroe explained that the Americas and Europe should remain separate areas of influence. He warned that if European powers tried to control or influence countries in the Americas, it would be seen as a danger to the United States. In return, the United States would not interfere with European colonies or the internal affairs of European nations.

At the time the doctrine was announced, the United States did not have a strong military, so European powers largely ignored it. However, the United Kingdom helped enforce the policy by supporting its own efforts to maintain peace in the region. Despite this, the doctrine was often ignored during the 19th century, such as during France’s second intervention in Mexico. By the early 20th century, the United States had grown strong enough to enforce the doctrine. It became a key part of American foreign policy and was used by many U.S. leaders, including Ulysses S. Grant, Theodore Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, and Donald Trump.

After 1898, the Monroe Doctrine was reinterpreted by legal experts and scholars to support cooperation among nations and avoid interference in others’ affairs. In 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt helped reaffirm this new meaning by co-founding the Organization of American States. Today, the doctrine is still discussed, changed, or used in different ways in the 21st century.

Origins of the Monroe Doctrine

According to Samuel Eliot Morison, "as early as 1783, the United States adopted the policy of staying separate from European affairs and announced its intention to avoid involvement in Europe. The added idea of the Monroe Doctrine, that European countries must stay out of the Americas, was still not yet in place."

Although the United States began as a country that wanted to stay separate from Europe, the idea behind the Monroe Doctrine was already forming soon after the American Revolution ended. Alexander Hamilton, writing in The Federalist Papers, wanted the United States to become a powerful country worldwide and hoped it would grow strong enough to keep European powers away from the Americas. At the time, European countries controlled more land in the Americas than the United States did. Hamilton believed the United States would one day be the most powerful country in the New World and would act as a go-between for European powers and any new nations forming near the U.S.

A note from James Madison (Thomas Jefferson’s secretary of state and a future president) to the U.S. ambassador to Spain expressed the U.S. government’s opposition to European countries gaining more land. Madison’s message might not have had much influence because, as noted earlier, European countries controlled far more land than the United States did. Although Jefferson supported France, the U.S. government under Jefferson told its ambassadors that the United States would not support any future efforts by European countries to colonize the North American continent.

The United States worried that the European powers that won the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815) might bring back monarchies. France had already agreed to restore the Spanish monarchy in exchange for Cuba. As the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) ended, Prussia, Austria, and Russia formed the Holy Alliance to protect monarchies. The Holy Alliance allowed military actions to restore the Bourbon monarchy in Spain and its colonies, which were trying to become independent.

British foreign policy matched the goal of the Monroe Doctrine. Britain secretly helped South American countries fight against Spain. Britain even offered to make a joint statement about the doctrine because it feared trade with the Americas would suffer if other European powers expanded their control there. For many years after the doctrine was created, Britain used its Royal Navy to enforce it, as the United States Navy was much smaller. The U.S. government did not make a joint statement because of the recent War of 1812. However, the immediate reason for action was the Russian Ukase of 1821, which claimed rights over the Pacific Northwest and banned non-Russian ships from approaching its coast.

Doctrine

The full text of the Monroe Doctrine, mainly written by John Quincy Adams, who later became president and was then the secretary of state, is long and written in formal and complex language. However, its main ideas are found in two important parts. The first part is an opening statement that says the New World is no longer open to European countries trying to take over land through colonization.

The second important part is directed at the "allied powers" of Europe. It explains that the United States will not take sides in European countries' existing colonies in the Americas but will not allow actions that create new colonies in the newly independent Spanish American republics.

Monroe's speech did not provide a clear or complete plan for foreign policy. It was mostly ignored until people who supported European countries not interfering in the Americas later tried to create a unified version of the Monroe Doctrine. It was not until the middle of the 20th century that the doctrine became an important part of the United States' overall strategy.

Effects

Because the United States did not have a strong navy or army at the time, many countries did not take the Monroe Doctrine seriously. Prince Klemens von Metternich of Austria was upset by the doctrine and wrote in private that it was a "new act of revolt" by the U.S. that might give "new strength to the apostles of sedition and reanimate the courage of every conspirator."

However, Britain quietly supported the doctrine. Britain used it as part of its larger plan called the Pax Britannica, which included protecting freedom of the seas. This matched Britain’s growing support for free trade and opposition to trade policies that limited competition. Britain’s growing industries needed new markets for their goods. If Latin American countries became Spanish colonies again, British access to these markets would be blocked by Spanish trade policies.

Latin American leaders generally welcomed the Monroe Doctrine but sometimes felt unsure about it. John A. Crow, author of The Epic of Latin America, wrote that leaders like Simón Bolívar, Santander in Colombia, and others saw the doctrine as a sign of support. Crow explained that these leaders knew the U.S. president had little power without British help and believed the doctrine could not be enforced if the U.S. acted alone against European powers.

Latin Americans appreciated the support from the U.S. but understood that their independence depended on Britain’s powerful navy. In 1826, Bolívar called for a "Pan-American" meeting in Panama. He and others saw the Monroe Doctrine as a tool for national goals, not a plan for shared action across the Americas. Some people, like Diego Portales of Chile, questioned the U.S. intentions, saying, "For the Americans of the north, the only Americans are themselves."

In Spanish America, royalist forces continued fighting in several countries, and Spain tried to retake Mexico in 1829. Only Cuba and Puerto Rico remained under Spanish control until the Spanish-American War in 1898.

In 1833, Britain claimed control of the Falkland Islands, breaking the Monroe Doctrine. The U.S. did not act, and historian George C. Herring noted this inaction "confirmed Latin American and especially Argentine suspicions of the United States." From 1838 to 1850, the Río de la Plata in Argentina was blocked by French and British navies. Again, the U.S. did not support Argentina as the doctrine required.

In 1842, U.S. president John Tyler used the Monroe Doctrine to warn Britain not to interfere in Hawaii, starting the process of annexing Hawaii. In 1845, president James K. Polk said the doctrine meant no European power could stop the U.S. from expanding westward, a policy called "manifest destiny."

In 1861, Dominican leader Pedro Santana made a deal with Spain, returning the Dominican Republic to colonial rule. Spain waited until the U.S. was busy with its Civil War to take control. After the war ended in 1865, the U.S. reasserted the Monroe Doctrine, leading Spain to remove its forces from the Dominican Republic.

In 1862, French forces led by Napoleon III invaded Mexico and placed a puppet monarch, Maximilian I, in power. The U.S. criticized this as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine but could not act because of the Civil War. This was the first time the doctrine was widely called a "doctrine." In 1865, the U.S. sent troops to Mexico’s border to pressure France, which eventually left. After France left, the U.S. declared the Monroe Doctrine had become a "fact."

In 1865, Spain took control of the Chincha Islands, breaking the Monroe Doctrine. In 1862, Britain merged its colonies in Belize into a single area called British Honduras. The U.S. did not object to these actions. In the 1870s, President Ulysses S. Grant and Secretary of State Hamilton Fish tried to replace European influence in Latin America with U.S. influence. In 1870, the Monroe Doctrine was expanded to say no land in the Americas could be given to European powers. Grant tried but failed to annex the Dominican Republic using the doctrine.

The Venezuelan crisis of 1895 was a major event in U.S.-British relations. Venezuela asked the U.S. to help with a dispute over land with Britain. President Grover Cleveland, through Secretary of State Richard Olney, warned Britain that the Monroe Doctrine meant the U.S. would act strongly if Britain did not settle the dispute. In 1895, Olney told Britain, "The United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."

British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury disagreed with this claim. The U.S. opposed a British plan to discuss the Monroe Doctrine’s meaning. Herring wrote that Britain’s failure to push further meant it accepted the U.S. view of the doctrine and U.S. dominance in the region. German leader Otto von Bismarck criticized the doctrine as "uncommon insolence." A tribunal in Paris decided the dispute in 1899, giving Britain most of the disputed land and all the gold mines. The decision had no explanation, disappointing Venezuelans. However, Venezuelans followed the ruling. This event showed the U.S. was becoming a global power through its use of the Monroe Doctrine.

Criticism

Historians have noted that the Monroe Doctrine included a promise to stop European countries from taking over more land in the Americas. However, it did not mention limits on what the United States could do, which led to strong actions in U.S. foreign policy. Historian Jay Sexton explained that the methods used to carry out the doctrine were similar to those used by European powers in the 17th and 18th centuries. American historian William Appleman Williams viewed the doctrine as a type of American imperialism and called it "imperial anti-colonialism." Noam Chomsky argued that the Monroe Doctrine was used by the U.S. government to claim dominance and the right to act alone in the Americas.

Use in Australia

In the early 1900s, Australia's foreign policy of stopping powerful countries from acting aggressively in the Pacific islands was called by Otto von Bismarck, Alfred Deakin, Billy Hughes, and several historians the "Australasian Monroe Doctrine," "Australian Monroe Doctrine," or the "Pacific Monroe Doctrine."

This term has been used again by commentators in the 2020s after Australia focused more on the Pacific region because of China's growing influence there.